been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy." *Held*, that the policies do not pass to the trustee. *Burlingham* v. *Crouse*, 24 Am. B. Rep. 632 (C. C. A., Second Circ.).

Subject to the proviso above quoted, the interest of a bankrupt in a policy on his own life, payable to himself or his personal representatives, passes to his trustee. *In re White*, 174 Fed. 333. An exception, logically indefensible, is made where the policy has no present value. *Gould* v. *New York Life Ins. Co.*, 132 Fed. 927. The earlier cases regarded the proviso as defining what policies passed to the trustee, and held that policies having no surrender value did not pass. *In re Buelow*, 98 Fed. 86; *Morris* v. *Dodd*, 110 Ga. 606. But the weight of authority now rightly denies such scope to the proviso. *In re Slingluff*, 106 Fed. 154; *In re Welling*, 113 Fed. 189; *In re Orear*, 178 Fed. 632. The principal case would seem to be justified on the theory that Congress intended to secure to the bankrupt the benefit of his investment on his accounting for its surrender value to the estate, and that the existence of a valid lien to the amount of the surrender value excuses payment. It has been held that the failure to schedule policies pledged for more than their surrender value is not fraudulent concealment. *In re Adams*, 104 Fed. 72. The Supreme Court has construed the proviso liberally by allowing its benefits where no surrender value is contracted for but the company's practice is to pay cash on surrender. *Hiscock* v. *Mertens*, 205 U. S. 202.

CONFLICT OF LAWS — PERSONAL JURISDICTION — STATUTE AUTHORIZING SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION. — The English Matrimonial Act provides that the co-respondent in divorce proceedings must be made a defendant and that service on him out of the country is sufficient. The defendant co-respondent was served in Scotland and objected that the court had not jurisdiction. *Held*, that such service confers jurisdiction on the English courts. *Rayment* v. *Rayment and Stuart*, [1910] P. 271.

Since the power of Parliament is supreme it may obviously grant jurisdiction to the English courts, in any cases it chooses, and the courts must carry out its commands. *Drummond* v. *Drummond*, L. R. 2 Ch. 32; *Ashbury* v. *Ellis*, [1893] A. C. 339. Any form of notice which the statute authorizes is sufficient, and it is even provided that, in the court's discretion, no notice whatsoever is necessary. 20 & 21 VICT. c. 85, § 42. But a judgment obtained in such a manner would be given no effect in other jurisdictions. *Buchanan* v. *Rucker*, 9 East 192; *D'Arcy* v. *Ketchum*, 11 How. (U. S.) 165. In the United States it has been repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment necessitates a service in the jurisdiction in all personal actions. *Pennoyer* v. *Neff*, 95 U. S. 714; *Eliot* v. *McCormick*, 144 Mass. 10. Furthermore, as the courts and the legislature in the United States are regarded as co-ordinate branches of government, the former may reject, as an interference with their rights, such efforts to confer a fictitious jurisdiction on them. Thus, even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, such statutes granting jurisdiction over non-residents were disregarded. *Beard* v. *Beard*, 21 Ind. 321. But see *Dearing* v. *Bank of Charleston*, 5 Ga. 497.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: CLASS LEGISLATION — COUNTY ORDINANCE PROHIBITING FISHING BY NON-RESIDENTS. — A statute permitted any county to pass ordinances forbidding fishing by non-residents within its limits. A county passed such an ordinance, and the defendant, a citizen of the state but a resident of another county, fished there. *Held*, that the statute is unconstitutional. *State* v. *Hill*, 53 So. 411 (Miss.).

Since *Magna Charta* it has been generally conceded that the royal prerogative did not entitle the king to grant exclusive fishing rights in navigable rivers.